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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the strong positive correlation that exists between the volume of
housing sales and housing prices. We first examine gross housing flows in the US and
divide sales into two categories: transactions that involve a change or choice of tenure, as
opposed to owner-to-owner churn. The literature suggests that the latter generates a
positive sales-to-price relationship, but we find that the former actually represents the
majority of transactions. We develop a simple model of these inter-tenure flows which
suggests they generate a negative price-to-sales relationship. This runs contrary to a
different literature on liquidity constraints and loss aversion. Empirically, we assemble
two data bases to test the model: a short panel of 33 MSA covering 1999-2008 and a long
panel of 101 MSA spanning 1982-2006. Our results from both are strong and robust.
Higher sales "Granger cause" higher prices, but higher prices "Granger cause" both lower
sales and a growing inventory of units-for-sale. These relationships together provide a
more complete picture of the housing market - suggesting the strong positive correlation
in the data results from frequent shifts in the negative price-to-sales schedule.
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I. Introduction.
As shown in Figure 1 below, there is a strong positive correlation between
housing sales (expressed as a percent of all owner households) and the movement in
housing prices (R =.66). On the surface the relationship looks to be close to
contemporaneous. There is also a somewhat less obvious negative relationship between
prices and the shorter series on the inventory of units for sale (R =.51), A number of
authors have offered explanations for these relationships, in particular that between prices
and sales.
Figure 1: US Housing Sales, Prices, Inventory
Sales, Inventory as % of stock
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On the one hand, there is a growing literature of models describing home owner
'"churn*" in the presence of search frictions [Wheaton (1990), Berkovec and Goodman
(1996), Lundberg and Skedinger (1999)]. In these models, buyers become sellers -there
are no entrants or exits from the market. In such a situation if participants pay higher
prices, they also receive more upon sale. It is the transaction cost of owning 2 homes
(during the moving period) that actually determines price levels. The greater transaction
costs accompanying high prices can make trading expensive enough to erase the original
gains from moving. In this environment Nash-bargained prices move almost inversely to
sales duration - equal to the vacant inventory divided by the sales flow. In these models,
both the inventory and sales churn are exogenous. Following Pissarides (2000) if the
matching rate is exogenous or alternatively of specific form, greater sales churn will
shorten duration and lead to higher prices. Similarly greater vacancy (inventory) raises
sale duration and causes lower prices.
There also are a series of papers which propose that negative changes in prices
will subsequently generate lower sales volumes. This again is a positive relationship
between the two variables, but with opposite causality. The first of these is by Stein
(1995) followed by Lamont and Stein (1999) and then Chan (2001). In these models,
liquidity constrained owners are again moving from one house to another (''churn") and
must make a down payment in order to purchase housing. When prices decline consumer
equity does likewise and fewer households have the remaining down payment necessary
to make a lateral move. As prices rise, equity recovers and so does market liquidity.
Relying instead on behavior economics, Genesove and Mayer (2001) and then Englehardt
(2003) show empirically that sellers who would loose some equity upon sale set higher
reservations than those who would not. With higher reservations, the market as a whole
should see lower sales if more and more sellers experience loss aversion as prices
continue to drop.
In this paper we try to unravel the relationship between housing prices and
housing sales, and in addition, the inventory of housing units for sale. We accomplish the
following:
1). First, we carefully examine gross housing flows in the AHS for the 1 1 years in
which the survey is conducted and find there are more purchases of homes by renters or
new households than there are by existing owners. Hence the focus on own-to-own trades
does not characterize the majority of housing sales transactions.
2). We also examine which flows add to the inventory of for-sale units (called
LISTS) and which subtract (called SALES). 'Own-to-own moves, for example do both.
We show with a simple model of tenure choice flows that higher prices should generate
more LISTS, lower SALES, and hence a larger inventory. When prices are low, the
reverse happens.
3). This leads us to hypothesize a very specific form ofjoint causality between
sales and prices. Own-to-own churn generates a positive schedule between sales and
prices as suggested by frictional market theory. At the same time, inter-tenure transitions
should lead to a negative schedule. In equilibrium, the overall housing market should rest
at the intersection of these two schedules.
4). To test these ideas we first assemble a US panel data base of 33 MSA from
1999-2008. The shortness of the panel is due to limited data on the for-sale inventory. An
estimated panel VAR model perfectly confirms our hypothesized relationships. Sales
positively drive subsequent prices while prices negatively drive subsequent sales and also
positively increase the inventory.
5). We also assemble a longer panel of 101 MSA from 1982 to 2006 on just sales
and prices. Using a wide range of model specifications and tests of robustness we find
again that sales positively "Granger cause" subsequent housing price movements, while
prices negatively "'Granger cause" subsequent housing sales. These joint relationships are
exactly as our model suggests when owner churn is combined with inter-tenure moves.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section II we set up an accounting
framework for more completely describing gross housing flows from the 2001 AHS.
This involves some careful assumptions to adequately document the magnitude of all the
inter tenure flows relative to within tenure churn and to household creation/dissolution. In
Section III, we develop a simple stylized model of the inter tenure flows to illustrate how
they can generate a negative relationship between prices and sales and a positive
relationship between prices and inventory. We present our hypothesized pair of
relationships between prices and the sales/inventory ratio. In section IV we test these
ideas with a short panel data base (33 MSA) that covers the inventory as well as prices
and sales. In sections V through VII we present an analysis of a longer panel data set
between just sales and prices across 101 MSA covering the years from 1982-2006. Here
again we find conclusive evidence that sales positively "Granger cause" prices and that
prices negatively "Granger cause" sales. Our analysis is robust to many alternative
specifications and subsample tests. We conclude with some thoughts about historic
market fluctuations as well as the outlook for US house prices and sales.
II. US Gross Housing Flows: Sales, Lists, and the Inventor}'.
Much of the theoretical literature on sales and prices investigates how existing
homeowners behave as they try and sell their current home to purchase a new one. This
flow is most often referred to as "churn". To investigate how important a role "churn"
plays in the ownership market, we closely examine the 2001 American Housing Survey.
In "Table 10"of the Survey, respondents are asked about the tenure of the residence they
previously lived in - for those that moved during the last year. The total number of
moves in this question is the same as the total in "Table 1 1" - asking about the previous
status of the current head (the respondent). In "Table 1 1" it turns out that 25% of current
renters moved from a residence situation in which they were not the head (leaving home,
divorce, etc.). The fraction is a smaller 12% for owners. What is missing is the joint
distribution between moving by the head and becoming a head. The AHS is not strictly
able to identify how many current owners moved either a) from another unit they owned
b) another unit they rented or c) purchased a house as they became a new or different
household.
To generate the full set of flows, we use information in "Table 1 1" about whether
the previous home was headed by the current head, a relative or acquaintance. We
assume that all current owner-movers who were also newly created households - were
counted in "Table 10" as being part of a previous owner household. For renters, we
assume that all renter-movers that were also newly created households were counted in
"Table 10" in proportion to renter-owner households in the full sample. Finally, we use
the Census figures that year for the net increase in each type of household, and from that
together with the data on moves we are able to identify household "exits" by tenure.
Gross household exits occur mainly through deaths, institutionalization (such as to a
nursing home), or marriage.
Focusing on just the owned housing market, the AHS also allows us to account
for virtually all of the events that add units to the inventory of houses for sale (herein
called LISTS) and all of those transactions that remove units from the inventory (herein
called SALES). There are two exceptions. The first is the net delivery of new housing
units. In 2001 the Census reports that 1,242,000 total units were delivered to the for-sale
market. Since we have no direct count of demolitions' we use that figure also as net and
it is counted as additional LISTS. The second is the net purchases of 2nd homes, which
must be counted as additional SALES, but about which there is simply little data". In
theory. LISTS - SALES should equal the change in the inventory of units for sale. These
relationships are depicted in Figure 2 and can be summarized with the identities below
(2001 AHS values are included).
SALES = Own-to-Own + Rent-to-Own + New Owner [+ 2 nd homes] = 5.281.000
LISTS = Own-to-Own + Own-to-Rent + Owner Exits + New homes = 5,179.000
Inventory Change = LISTS - SALES
Net Owner Change = New Owners - Owner Exits + Rent-to-Own - Own-to-Rent
Net Renter Change = New Renters - Renter Exits + Own-to-Rent - Rent-to-Own
(1)
The only other comparable data is from the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). and it reports that in 2001 the inventory of units for sale was nearly stable. The
NAR however reports a slightly higher level of sales at 5.335.000 existing units. This
small discrepancy could be explained by repeat moves within a same year since the AHS
asks only about the most recent move. It could also represent 2 nd home sales which again
are not part of the AHS move data.
What is most interesting to us is that almost 60% of SALES involve a buyer who
is not transferring ownership laterally from one owned house to another. So called
"churn" is actually a minority of sales transactions. The various flows between tenure
categories also are the more critical determinant of change-in-inventory since "churn"
sales leave the inventory unaffected. .
The growth in stock between 1980-1990-2000 Censuses closely matches summed completions suggesting
negligible demolitions over those decades. The same calculation between 1960 and 1970 however suggests
removal of 3 million units.
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Net second home purchases might be estimated from the product of: the share of total gross home
purchases that are second homes (reported by Loan Performance as 15.0%) and the share of new homes in
total home purchases (Census, 25%). This would yield 3-4% of total transactions or about 200,000 units.
There are no direct counts of the annual change in 2" home stocks.
The AHS is a repeat sample of housing units and excludes moves into new houses. Thus we compare its
move number to NAR sales (both single and multi family) of existing units.
Figure 2: US Housing Gross Flows (2001)
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(SALES)
(1) New Owner
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(SALES)
Renter to Owner =
2,468.000 (SALES)
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Owner to Owner = 2,249.000
(LISTS & SALES)
Owners = 72,593,000
Net Increase = 1,343,000
Renters = 34,417,000
Net Increase = -53,000
Renter to Renter = 6,497.000
(2) Owner Exits =
359,000 (LISTS)
Owner to Renter =
,330,000 (LISTS)
Net New Homes =
1.242,000. (LISTS)
(2) Renter Exits =
1,360,000
In Figure 2. most inter-tenure SALES would seem to be events that one might
expect to be negatively sensitive to housing prices. When prices are high presumably new
created owner household formation is discouraged or at least deflected into new renter
household formation. Likewise moves which involve changes in tenure from renting to
owning also should be negatively sensitive to house prices. Both result because higher
prices simply make owning a house less affordable. At this time we are agnostic about
how net 2 nd home sales are related to prices.
On the other side of Figure 2, many of the events generating LISTS should be at
least somewhat positively sensitive to price. New deliveries certainly try to occur when
prices are high, and such periods would be appropriate for any owners who wish or need
to "cash out", consume equity or voluntarily choose to switch to renting. At this time we
are still seeking a direct data source which investigates in more detail what events tend to
generate the own-to-rent moves. Thus the flows in and out of homeownership in Figure 2
suggest that when prices are high sales are likely to decrease lists increase and the
inventory grow.
The AHS has been conducted only semi-annually until recently and also has used
consistent definitions of moving only since 1985. In Appendix III we calculate the flows
for each of the 1 1 AHS surveys between 1985 and 2007. The flows are remarkably
stable, although there exists some year to year variations. In all years, own-to-own moves
("chuirT) are less than the sum of new owners plus rent-to-own moves. Since the 2001
survey, the AHS calculated values for LIST-SALES have increased significantly. This is
consistent with the growing national for-sale inventory reported in the NAR data over
this period.
III. A stylized model of inter-tenure flows.
Here we assume that the total number of households T is fixed with H < T being
home owners. Those not owning rent at some fixed (exogenous) rent - hence we largely
ignore the rental market. The total stock of units available for ownership U(p) is assumed
to depend positively on price (long run supply) and with fixed rents we ignore rental
supply. In this situation the inventory of units for sale is the difference between the owner
stock and owner households: I = U(p) - H.
Households flow out of ownership at some constant rate a which could represent
unemployment, foreclosure, or other economic shock. Rental households purchase units
out of the owner stock (become owners) at some rate s(p) which we presume depends
negatively on price. High prices (relative to the fixed rent) make ownership less
appealing, but in general renters wish to become owners because of some assumed
advantage (a tax subsidy for example). - hence the purchase rate is always positive.
The equations below summarize both flows (time derivatives) and steady state
values (denoted with *). In Equation (2) the stable homeownership rate depends
negatively on prices and the constant economic shock rate. When prices generate a sales
rate equal to the economic shock rate, homeownership is 50%. Equation (3) cleanly
divides up the inventory change into the same two categories from our more detailed flow
diagram: LISTS-SALES. Here LISTS are stock change (new construction) plus own-to-
rent flows (economic shocks) while SALES are rent-to-own flows. The equilibrium level
of SALES is in (5), and the equilibrium inventory in (4). The latter must be constrained
positive.
dH/dt = s(p)[T-H]-aH, H' = S("P)T (2)
a + s(p)
dl I dt = dU I dt - dH I dt = [dU I dt + aH]- s(p)[T - H], (3
)
l'=U(p)-H' = <*U(P) + s(P)U(P)-sT>o (4)
a + s{p)
. as(p)T
s(p)[T-H ] = — (5)
a + s{p)
In (6) we derive comparative statics which show that as prices increase, the steady
state value of the inventory grows and the steady state level of SALES decreases - as
hypothesized about the flows which were diagramed in Figure 2.
dl' I dp = dU/dp-dH' /dp = dU/dp- P [\—^7 >0 (6)
a + s a + s
d (s(P)[T-H'])/dp = £™^[l-^_] <
a + s a + s
Again, the conclusions above follow from the assumptions that long run stock is
positively related to price and the sales rate is negative related to price. Thus this simple
model of inter-tenure flows establishes a negative relationship between housing prices
and Sales/Inventory ratios. Alternatively, there should be a positive relationship between
prices and duration.
With this new schedule between prices and duration we are now ready to better
describe the full set of relationships in the owner market between sales, prices and the
inventor)'. We combine this new schedule with a positive schedule between prices and
the Sale/Inventory ratio - created from the various models of own-to-own decisions. In
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these latter models it is sales that are determining prices, while with the model in (2)-(5)
above it is prices that are determining sales. At a more complete equilibrium (in the
ownership market) sales, prices and the inventory all rest at the intersection of the two
schedules shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 presents a more complete picture of the housing
market than the models of Stein, Wheaton, or Berkovec and Goodman - since it accounts
for the very large role of inter-tenure mobility as well as for owner churn.
FIGURE 3: Housing Market Equilibrium(s)
Search Based Pricing
(own-to-own "churn")
WO
Pricing based Sales
(Inter-tenure choices)
Sales / Inventory
The out-of-equilibrium dynamics of this model are also appealing and seem in
line with economic intuition as well. Consider a permanent increase in economic shocks
(a). Using (2)- (5), owner households decline, and the inventory increases. Sales however
also increase and so the impact on duration is technically ambiguous. Within a wide
range of reasonable parameter values however, we can show that the sale/inventory ratio
declines with greater a - the net shift in the price-to-sales schedule is therefore inward.
The new equilibrium then results in lower prices with a lower sales/inventory ratio as
well (a higher duration). If we shift the s(p) schedule up (e.g. a greater tax subsidy) the
number of owners increases, the inventory drops, and sales increase. This leads to an
4 A sufficient condition is for the number of renters [T-H] to exceed the for-sale inventor)'.
unambiguous rightward shift in the price-to-sales schedule with a corresponding rise in
equilibrium Sales/Inventory (drop in duration). Prices of course rise as well.
The next task is to see if we can empirically identify the relationships in Figure 3.
For this, we examine two several panel data bases with different degrees of richness. The
first data base is shorter and covers only 33 MSA. Its advantage is that it includes data on
the inventory for sale by market - a series which the NAR has collected only recently.
The second data base is much longer, covers 101 MSA, but includes only information on
sales and prices.
IV. A Short Panel Analysis of Metropolitan Sales, Prices and Inventory.
Carefully constructed series on house prices are available from the late 1970s or
early 1 980s and for a wide range of metropolitan areas. The price data we use is the
deflated OFHEO repeat sales series [Baily, Muth, Nourse (1963)]. This data series has
recently been questioned for not factoring out home improvements or maintenance and
for not factoring in depreciation and obsolescence [Case, Pollakowski, Wachter (1991),
Harding. Rosenthal, Sirmans (2007)]. That said we are left with what is available, and
the OFHEO index is the most consistent series available for most US markets over a long
time period. The only alternative is CSW/FISERV, and it is available for far fewer
metropolitan areas that in turn are disproportionately concentrated in the south and west.
In terms of sales, the only consistent source is that provided by the National
Association of Realtors (NAR). The NAR data is for single family units only (it excludes
condominium sales at the MSA level), but is available for each MSA over a period from
1980 to the present. The more limiting data series is that on the inventory of housing
units for sale. Here the NAR distributes MSA data only from 1999 or later. We have been
able to put together all three series since 1999 for 33 MSA, and Figures 4 through 6
depict the 33 series for each variable. The patterns are quite discernable and in Appendix
I we present summary statistics for each market.
In Figure 4 we clearly see all house prices rising and then falling since 1999. The
sample almost evenly divides between market where this movement is very pronounced
and those with only the slightest of changes. In terms of the inventory, Figure 5 shows
that over the first half of the sample the inventory was roughly constant. After 2004 it
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rises and falls in a pattern again similar to prices. Both the Prices and Inventory are raw
series and exhibit little seasonality. As for sales, in Figure 6 we see a little bit of the same
"hump shaped" pattern, but it seems weaker. What is more problematic with the sales
data is the strong pattern of seasonality in each series - seasonality that varies by specific
market in many cases.
Figure 4: Quarterly Real House Prices (33 MSA), 1999-2008
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Figure 5: Quarterly For-Sale Inventory (33 MSA), 1999-2008
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Figure 6: Quarterly House Sales (33 MSA), 1999-2008
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These observations suggest that a panel VAR is an appropriate instrument to test
the relationships between prices, sales and inventory. In the VAR we will have each
variable depending on lagged values of itself and the other variables. If the panel is of
order one, we also can use each coefficient as an effective test of "Granger causality".
Before turning to such a model, however, we need to examine each series to see if they
are stationary. There are two tests available for use with panel data and in each, the null
hypothesis is that sum or average of all the individual series have unit roots and are non
stationary. In Levin-Lin (LL, 1993) the null has no constant (or drift) while in Im-
Persaran-Shin (IPS, 2002) the null includes a constant to allow for drift. In Table 1 we
report the results of this test for housing prices, sales and inventory - in levels. With the
possible exception of prices, where we can be confident only at the 7% level, the non-
stationary null is rejected and we should be on solid grounds undertaking our proposed
VAR.
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Table 1: Stationary tests, Short Panel
Inventory' (Augmented by 1 quarters)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.17706 -11.214 -2.43396 0.0075
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -2.482 -2.114 0.017
Sale (Augmentec by 1 quarters)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.02848 -3.924 -3.85330 0.0001
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -3.221 -10.906 0.000
Price (Augmented byl quarters)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.00977 -6.168 -6.05783 0.0000
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.750 -1.477 0.070
In panel VAR models with individual heterogeneity there exists a specification
issue: the error term can be correlated with the lagged dependent variables [Nickell,
(1981)]. OLS estimation can yield coefficients that are both biased and also that are not
consistent in the number of cross-section observations. Consistency occurs only in the
number of time series observations. Thus estimates and any tests on the parameters of
interest may not be reliable. These problems might not be serious in our case since we
have 32 quarterly time series observations (more than many panel models). To be on the
safe side, however, we also estimated the equations following an estimation strategy by
Holtz-Eakin et al. As discussed in Appendix II, this amounts to using 2-period lagged
values of sales and prices as instruments with GLS estimation.
A final concern with our VAR is the handling of seasonality. Here we propose 2
adjustments. In Tables 2 and 3, we report results using quarterly seasonal effects
interacted with the cross section fixed effects. This effectively allows each MSA to have
its own set of seasonal influences. Our second approach is to change all of the lags in the
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VAR to 4-periods rather than one. In effect we are asking how our vector of variables
relates to the vector lagged a year previous rather than a quarter ago. The year-over-year
VAR results are presented in Table 4. 5
Table 2: OLS Quarterly Panel VAR, 1999-2007, 33 MSA
(1 quarter lags, interactive seasonal effects)
P=a +YaO,+ .9795975 Pu . -.000594 /„ , +.0004185 S,n , R 2 =0.9889"
'
4f
'*->
(234.97) ""' (-8,98) ""' (7,78) ""'
4
/ = a, +Y a, O, +.93504797, . +37.95637 P.. -.0819372 5,,., R 2 =.9660
"
' ^ '-' (79.82)
""'
(5.15)
""'
(-0.86)
""''
4
S =a+Ya,0, +.9209442 Su . -1.332737 P. , - .0040554 /„.. R 2 =.9950
(87.66) (-164) (-3.14 )
Table 3: Holtz-Eakin Quarterly Panel VAR, 1999-2007, 33 MSA
(1 quarter lags, interactive seasonal effects)
p
'
= a
,
+ Y a,0,+ .9819115 P.. .- .000966 I... +.0006243 S.n ,
"
' j^ '~> (427.85) ""' (-22.31) ""' (19 79) ""'
4
/ = a . + Y a,Q, + .8864376 /„ , + 94.84853 P„ , - .0774326 S„ ,
"
' ^ ' («09)
"""'
( 764) "-' (-0.57) ""'
4
S. = a,. +Ya,.0,T .916015 5„ ,- 2.864344 P, .- .0041445 /, ,,
' ^ J (76.60) " -l (-184) ""' (-2.30) ""'
Table 4: OLS Quarterly Panel VAR, 1999-2007, 33 MSA
(4 quarter lags)
P„ = a, + .833 P„ 4 - .0021 /„ 4 + .0012 5, 4 , R - = .885
(63 1)
"-
(-S 5)
""
(9 4)
"" '
/„ = a, + .921 /„_< +93 .9/>„_ 4 + -032 5„. 4> R
2
= .945
(53 .2) (10 .1) (3 3)
S„ = a, +.819 S„_
4
-102
.6 P„_ 4 -.072 7„. 4 , R
2
= .98
(52 .3) (-67) (-2.4)
5 We do not report the cross section fixed effects, nor their interactive terms. Many, but not all are
significant. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below each coefficient.
16
In examining Tables 2-4, we find that our three hypotheses are validated in every
case. First, the inventory negatively impacts price while sales has a positive effect.
Interestingly the coefficient on inventory is always slightly larger than sales. In a log
model if the ratio (duration) were all that mattered the coefficients would be identical in
magnitude. In this linear model they are close enough to suggest a similar conclusion.
Secondly, the inventory responds quite significantly (and positively) to prices. Thirdly,
prices negatively impact subsequent sales. All of these effects are statistically significant,
but the price impact on Sales shows up more strongly in the 4-quarter lag model. In the 1-
quarter model it is at the threshold of significance. In all respects, the results fully support
equations (2)-(5) and the pair of relationships in Figure 3. Duration negatively "Granger
causes" subsequent prices to decline. Price then positively "Granger causes" the
inventory to grow, and likewise for sales to decline. The first VAR equation validates the
upward schedule in Figure 3 while the second and third combine to yield the downward
schedule.
In comparing the different models we note that the Holtz-Eakin estimation does
increase the coefficients a bit and reduce standard errors - relative to the OLS results. We
did not undertake Holtz-Eakin estimation for our 4-quarter lag model. The OLS 4-quarter
results are expected!}' different. Inventory and sales, for example, have an impact on
prices 4 periods hence that is roughly 4 times their impact in the 1 -quarter model.
Similarly, prices impact sales 4 quarters hence with much greater impact than from just 1
quarter back.
V. A long-Panel of Metropolitan Sales and Prices.
It is possible to test the just the relationship between prices and sales over a much
longer time horizon - if we ignore the inventory. 6 For this we assemble a larger panel
data base covering 101 MSA and spanning the years 1982 through 2006. This panel was
6
There have been a few recent attempts test the relationship between movements in sales and prices.
Leung, Lau, and Leong (2002) undertake a time series analysis of Hong Kong Housing and conclude that
stronger Granger Causality is found for sales driving prices rather than prices driving sales. Andrew and
Meen (2003) examine a UK Macro time series using a VAR model and conclude that transactions respond
to shocks more quickly than prices, but do not necessarily "Granger Cause" price responses. Both studies
are hampered by limited observations.
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purposely structured to be annual so as to avoid the seasonality of the shorter panel, while
still maintaining plentiful time-based degrees of freedom.
Over this longer period, many metropolitan areas almost doubled their housing
stock so we decided to standardize the sales data to eliminate some of the trend. Raw
sales were compared with yearly Census estimates of the number of total households in
those markets. Dividing single family sales by total households we get an estimated sales
rate for each market in each period. Using sales rates also eliminated much of the cross
section variation in the raw number of sales. In a similar manner we set the real price
level in each market to 100 in the base year. These re-scaling of the data will help make
the cross section fixed effects smaller in the estimated VAR models.
In Figures 7 and 8 we illustrate the constant dollar OFHEO price series along
with the yearly NAR sales rate data, for all 101 of our markets. Over this time frame, the
price series vary widely across markets, with some areas experiencing long term
although episodic increases (e.g. San Francisco) while others are almost totally constant
(e.g. Dallas). As for the sales rates, virtually every market has a slow gradual trend in
sales rates, with the sample average increasing from 3% to 5.6 %. In appendix III we
present the summary statistics for each market's price and sales rate series.
The data in Figure 4 through 6 for the short panel showed no obvious trends;'
prices, sales and the inventory generally rise and then fall. The longer term series in
Figures 7 and 8 may have more persistent trends and so again we need to test for whether
the series are stationary. In Table 5 we report the results of both Levin-Lin and IPS tests
for both housing price and sale rate levels.
With both tests the null for house prices is rejected at high confidence levels, but
with the IPS test the null hypothesis for the sales rate is quite likely to hold. Given the
steady trends seen in Figure 8, this of course seems reasonable. To be on the safe side,
then we estimate our long term sales-price VAR in differences as well as levels.
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Figure 7: Annual House Prices (101 MSA), 1982-2006
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TABLE 5: Stationary tests, Long Panel
RHPI (Augmented bv 1 lag, no constant for Levin lin's test)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.06626 -12.158 -11.71630 0.0000
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.772 -2.729 0.003
SFSALESRATE (Augmented bv 1 ag. . no constant for Levin lin's test)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.03852 -5.550 -5.34822 0.0000
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.339 1.847 0.968
Since economies change more in the longer term, we decided to include several
conditioning variables. The conditioning variables we choose are market specific
employment, and the national mortgage rate. The resulting 2-variable VAR in levels is
shown in (7), while in (8) the companion model is presented in first differences.
P,j =ao+«ip/.,-i +«aV, + /7'^//+ 3 +*,.,
Su =7o + r,Vi +/2PU-\+^XU + 7l +£u
AP,, =a +a
i
AP
IJ _ l
+a 2ASIJ_ l +/3'AXIJ +5, +£,,
^,.« =7o + /i AV> +y2 &P,. l_ i +A , AX, J +?], +£
(7)
(8)
We estimate each model using both OLS and also applying the previously
discussed estimation strategy by Holtz-Eakin et al. From either estimates, we conduct a
"Granger" causality test. Since we are only testing for a single restriction, the t statistic is
the square root of the F statistic that would be used to test the hypothesis in the presence
of a longer lag structure (Greene, 2003). Hence, we can simply use a t test (applied to
7
In (6) the fixed effects are cross-section trends rather than cross section levels as in (5)
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the a, and y2 ) as the check of whether changes in sales "Granger cause" changes in price
and/or whether prices "Granger cause" sales.
In table 6 we report the results of equations (7) and (8) in each set of rows.
The first column uses OLS estimation, the second the Random Effects IV estimates from
Holtz-Eakin et al. Interestingly, the two estimation techniques yield quite similar
coefficients - as might be expected with a larger number of time series observations and
data rescaling to reduce the cross section effects.The first set of equations is in levels,
while the second set of rows reports the results using differences. In all Tables, variable
names are self evident and variable differences are indicated with the prefix GR. Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis.
Among the levels equations, we first notice some anomalies. The mortgage
interest rate in the price levels equation is always of the wrong sign, and the employment
coefficient in the OLS sales rate equation is insignificant (despite almost 2500
observations). A more troublesome result is that the price levels equation has excess
"momentum" - lagged prices have a coefficient greater than one. Hence prices (levels)
can grow on their own without necessitating any increases in fundamentals, or sales. We
suspect that these two anomalies are likely the result of the non-stationary feature to both
the price and sales series when measured in levels. When we move to the results of
estimating the equations in differences all of these issues disappear. The lagged price
coefficients are less than one so the price equations are stable in the 2
n
degree, and the
signs of all coefficients are both correct - and highly significant.
As to the question of causality, in every price or price growth equation, lagged
sales or growth in sales is always significantly positive. Furthermore in every sales rate or
growth in sales rate equation, lagged prices (or its growth) are also always significant.
There is clear evidence ofjoint causality, and the effect oflaggedprices on sales is
always ofa negative sign. Holding lagged sales (and conditioning variables) constant, a
year after there is an increase in prices - sales fall. This is the opposite of that predicted
by theories of loss aversion or liquidity constraints, but fully consistent with the role
played by tenure choices in Figure 2 and our simple model of these flows.
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TABLE 6: Annual Sales-Price VAR, 1982-2006
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Levels
Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant -28.20461**
( 2.324949)
-37.72296**
(1.832941)
Real Price (lag 1) 1.074879**
(0.0064924)
1.03659**
(0.0048785)
Sales Rate (lag 1) 3.402427"
(0.1735139)
4.759024**
(0.1520669)
Mortgage Rate 0.4064326**
(0 .0989936)
0.7712427**
(0.0762181)
Employment 0.0085368**
(0.0014575)
0.0114432**
(0.0018957)
Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant 2.263661**
(0.1623367)
2.473909**
(0.1699231)
Real Price (lag 1) -0.0071418**
(0.0004533)
-0.0077217**
(0.0004666)
Sales Rate (lag 1) 0.8484933**
(0.0121154)
0.665248**
(0.013338)
Mortgage -0.0615272**
(0.0069121)
-0.0766582**
(0.0068535)
Employment 0.0000882
(0.0001018)
0.0011314**
(0.0001835)
First Difference
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant -0.3966703**
(0.1231288)
-0.9248402**
(0.1219398)
GR Real Price (Lag 1) 0.7570639**
(0.014764)
0.6737341**
(0.013863)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1) 0.0293207**
(0.0058313)
0.0546765 **
(0.0061649)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.0901117**
(0.0099561)
-0.1197969**
(0.009232)
GR Employment 0.3123949**
(0 .0394799)
0.5318401 **
(0.0414994)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant 0.8397989**
( 0.393873)
1.526134**
(0 .4334829)
GR Real Price (Lag1) -0.7050644**
(0.0472282)
-1.106593**
(0.0578562)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1) 0.0544417**
(0.0186536)
-0.02252
(0.0188086)
??
GR Mortgage Rate -.3251265"
(0.0318483)
-0.3078643**
(0.031781)
GR Employment 1.134269**
(0.126291)
1.391958**
(0.1463704)
** indicates significance at 5%.
We have experimented with these models using more than a single lag, but
qualitatively the results are the same. In levels, the price equation with two lags becomes
dynamically stable in the sense that the sum of the lagged price coefficients is less than
one. As to causal inference, the sum of the lagged sales coefficients is positive, highly
significant, and passes the Granger F test. In the sales rate equation, the sum of the two
lagged sales rates is virtually identical to the single coefficient above and the lagged price
levels are again significantly negative (in their sum). Collectively higher lagged prices
"Granger cause" a reduction in sales. We have similar conclusions when two lags are
used in the differences equations, but in differences, the 2nd lag is always insignificant.
As a final test, we investigate a relationship between the growth in house prices
and the level of the sales rate. In the search theoretic models sales rates determine price
levels, but if prices are slow to adjust, the impact of sales might better show up on price
changes. Similarly the theories of loss aversion and liquidity constraints relate price
changes to sales levels. While the mixing of levels and changes in time series analysis is
generally not standard, this combination of variables is also the strong empirical fact
shown in Figure 1 . In Table 7 price changes are tested for Granger causality against the
level of sales (as a rate).
TABLE 7: Annual Sales-Price Mixed VAR, 1981-2006
Differences and Levels Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant -6.698605**
(0.3568543)
-11.10693**
(0.4174099)
GR Real Price (lag 1) 0.5969905**
(0.015889)
0.4286127**
(0.0156827)
Sales Rate (lag 1) 1.424051**
(0.0760102)
2.340478**
(0.0912454)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.1230876**
(0.009451)
-0.1573441**
(0.0086482)
GR Employment 0.4987545**
(0.0349922)
0.7781044**
(0.0373462)
23
Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant -0.0458271"
(0.0541373)
0.283191"
(0.0642588)
GR House Price (lag 1) -0.0328973"
(0.0024105)
-0.0355432"
(0.002961)
Sales Rate (lag 1) 1.01549"
(0.0115313)
0.9482599"
(0.0139037)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.0156137"
(0.0014338)
-0.0132519"
(0.0013497)
GR Employment 0.0462483"
(0.0053086)
0.7280071"
(0.1643153)
** indicates significance at 5%
In terms of causality, these results are no different than the models estimated
either in all levels or all differences. One year after an increase in the level of sales, the
growth in house prices accelerates. Similarly, one year after house price growth
accelerates the level of home sales falls. All conditioning variables are significant and
correctly signed and lagged dependent variables have coefficients less than one.
VII. Long Panel Tests of Robustness.
In panel models it is always a good idea to provide some additional tests of the
robustness of results, usually by dividing up either the cross section or time series of the
panel into subsets and examining these results as well. Here we perform both tests. First
we divide the MSA markets into two groups: so-called "coastal" cities that border either
ocean, and "interior" cities that do not. There are 31 markets in the former group and 70
in the latter. The coastal cities are often felt to be those with strong price trends and
possibly different market supply behavior. These results are in Table 8. The second test is
to divide the sample up by year - in this case we estimate separate models for 1981-1 992
and 1993-2006. The year 1992 generally marks the bottom of the housing market from
the 1990 recession. These results are depicted in Table 9. Both experiments use just the
differences model that seems to provide the strongest results from the previous section.
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TABLE 8: Geographic Sub Panels, 1982-2006
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Coastal MSA Interior MSA Coastal MSA Interior MSA
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -0.4766326**
(0.272633)
-0.3510184
(0.130979)
-1.188642**
(0.2669406)
-0.721773"
(0.1290227)
GR Real Price
(Lag1)
0.7340125**
(0.0271992)
.77654**
(0.0173987)
0.6845244**
(0.0255055)
0.6926984**
(0.0162093)
GR Sales Rate
(Lag 1)
0.0615042**
(0.0133799)
0.016732**
(0.0061206)
0.089245**
(0.0135344)
0.0373314**
(0.0064948)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.0885175**
(0.0214447)
-0.0908632**
(0.0107238)
-0.1275495**
(0.020204)
-0.1119299**
(0.0098326)
GR Employment 0.413934**
(0.0864868)
0.2599301**
(0.0422536)
0.6823408**
(0.0890938)
0.4168953**
(0.0438112)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant 1.01577**
(0 .71945)
0.726351**
(0.4706282)
0.9888512**
(0.7707496)
1.406108**
(0.5151945)
GR Real Price
(Lag1)
-0.7510799**
(0.0717759)
-0.680113**
(0.0625164)
-0.9596828**
(0.0802649)
-1.092057**
(0.0775659)
GR Sales Rate
(Lag1)
-0.0111514
(0.0353082)
0.0786527**
(0.0219922)
-0.0686389**
(0.0362451)
.013674
(0.0219432)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.3092647**
(0.0565903)
-0.3335691**
(0.0385322)
-0.3139948**
(0057035)
-.3112734**
(0.0383706)
GR Employment 1.265646**
(0.2282296)
1.097809**
(0.1518239)
1.651104**
(0.2580107)
1.285375**
(0.1738679)
Note:
a) *- 10 percent si
b) MSAs denoted
c) MSAs denoted
gnificance. **- 5 percent significance.
coastal are MSAs near the East or West Coast (see Appendix I).
interior are MSAs that are not located at the East or West Coast.
In Table 8, the results of Table 6 hold up remarkably strong when the panel is
divided by region. The coefficient of sales rate (growth) on prices is always significant
although so-called "costal" cities have larger coefficients. In the equations of price
(growth) on sales rates, the coefficients are always significant, and the point estimates
are very similar as well. The negative effect of prices on sales rates is completely
identical across the regional division of the panel sample. It should be pointed out that all
of the instruments are correctly signed and significant as well.
The conclusion is the same when the panel is split into two periods (Table 9). The
coefficients of interest are significant and of similar magnitudes across time periods, and
all instruments are significant and correctly signed as well. The strong negative impact of
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prices on sales clearly occurred during 1982-1992 as well as over the more recent period
from 1993-2006. With fewer time series observations in each of the (sub) panels in
Table 9, the Holtz-Eakin estimates are now sometimes more different than the OLS
results.
TABLE 9: Time Subpanels, 101 MSA
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
1982-1992 1993-2006 1982-1992 1993-2006
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -2.648239**
(0.2403419)
0.1098486
(0.1788311)
-2.597524**
(0.2538611)
0.0280176
(0.1594721)
GR Real Price
(LaaU
.5533667**
(0.0273908)
0.7581002**
(0.0202692)
0.7006637**
(0.0281998)
0.709152**
(0.0212374)
GR Sales Rate
(Lag 1)
0.0204875**
(0.0074812)
0.0631485**
(0.0114222)
0.0273097**
(0.0081297)
0.0373903**
(0.0114339)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.2309851**
(0.0195574)
-0.113025**
(0.0148469)
-0.2164034**
(0.0174734)
-0.1088119**
(0.0120579)
GR Employment 0.6215331**
(0.0644479)
0.3634738**
(0.0594376)
0.5073589**
(0.0719732)
0.5722806**
(0.0629962)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -6.077011**
(0.9073653)
3.339319**
(0.494379)
-4.553209**
(1.017364)
4.601864**
(0.5978177)
GR Real Price
(Lag1)
-0.8804394**
(0.1034087)
-0.7628642**
(0.0560344)
-0.9065855**
(0.1359358)
-0.8880742**
(0.0738609)
GR Sales Rate
(Lag 1)
0.0053538
(0.0282439)
-0.0100386**
(0.0315767)
0.0706683
(0.0302102)
-0.0313258
(0.035461)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.5534765**
(0.0738353)
-0.3843505**
(0.0410443)
-0.5593403**
(0.0731325)
-0.2695104**
(0.0383087)
GR Employment 2.564815**
(0.2433108)
0.7280071**
(0.1643153)
1.88701**
(0.293079)
0.5015754**
(0.2095683)
Note:
a) Column labeled under 1982-1992 refer to the results using observations that span
those years..
b) Column labeled under 1993-2006 refer to the results using observations that span
those years.
VII. Conclusions
We have shown that the "Granger causal" relationship from prices-to-sales is
actually negative - rather than positive. Our empirics are quite strong. As an explanation,
we have argued that actual flows in the housing market are remarkably large between
tenure groups - and that a negative price-to-sales relationship makes sense as a reflection
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of these inter-tenure flows. Higher prices lead more households to choose renting than
owning and these flows decrease SALES. Higher prices also increase LISTS and so the
inventory grows. Conversely, when prices are low, entrants exceed exits into ownership,
SALES increase, LISTS decline and so does the inventory.
Our empirical analysis also overwhelmingly supports the positive sales-to-price
relationship that emerges from search-based models of housing churn. Here, a high
sales/inventon' ratio causes higher prices and a low ratio generates lower prices. Thus we
arrived at a more complete description of the housing market at equilibrium - as shown
with the two schedules in Figure 3.
Figure 3 offers a compelling explanation for why in the data, the simple price-
sales correlation is so overwhelmingly positive. Over time it must be the "price based
sales"' schedule that is shifting up and down. Remember that this schedule is derived
mainly from the decision to enter or exit the ownership market. Easy credit availability
and lower mortgage rates, for example would shift the schedule up (or out). For the same
level of housing prices, easier credit increases the rent-to-own flow, decreases the own-
to-rent flow, and encourages new households to own. SALES expand and the inventory
contracts. The end result of course is a rise in both prices as well as sales. Contracting
credit does the reverse. In the post WWII history of US housing, such credit expansions
and contractions have indeed tended to dominate housing market fluctuations [Capozza,
Hendershott, Mack (2004)].
Figure 3 also is useful for understanding the current turmoil in the housing
market. Easy mortgage underwriting from "subprime capital" greatly encouraged
expanded homeownership from the mid 1990s through 2005 [Wheaton and Nechayev,
(2007)]. This generated an outward shift in the price-based-sales schedule. Most recently,
rising foreclosures have expanded the rent-to-own flow and shifted the "price based
sales" schedule back inward. This has decreased both sales and prices. Preventing
foreclosures through credit amelioration programs theoretically would move the schedule
upward again, but so could any countervailing policy of easing mortgage credit.
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APPENDIX I: Sales, Prices, Inventory statistics for Short Panel
Market
Code
Market Average
Yearly
Change in
Real Price
Index
(%)
Average
Inventory
Average
number of
Sales
1 Dallas 0.009389 27765.84 5060.031
2 Houston 0.021073 29451.69 5274.866
3 Austin 0.030452 8341.217 1846.983
4 Los Angeles 0.075205 169724.2 37086.3
5 San Francisco 0.054361 59371.1 18343.6
6 San Diego 0.060397 85596.3 14763.43
7 Riverside 0.064271 65512.58 16534.53
8 Oakland 0.05496 34458.68 10413.08
9 Ventura 0.059364 14962.35 5015.75
10 Orange County 0.066787 68704.65 14874.88
11 Akron -0.00793 21536.21 2954.509
12 Atlanta 0.011579 251270.1 26648.73
13 Baltimore 0.064701 30307.89 6897.025
14 Columbus 0.000834 46261.74 6603.301
15 Honolulu 0.067967 7333.894 1394.813
16 Kansas City 0.010979 52400.64 9495.937
17 Las Vegas 0.042517 19149.78 9506.009
18 Louisville 0.00919 30180.93 4507.799
19 Memphis -0.00037 38817.24 5431.602
20 Miami 0.082253 97230.11 9453.403
21 Milwaukee 0.024482 21320.8 4223.433
22 Nashville 0.018568 34115.38 6109.578
23 New York 0.063452 67426.32 31415.68
24 Oklahoma City 0.017577 32241.31 6680.985
25 Omaha 0.003076 16562.51 3143.348
26 Phoenix 0.054298 89985.95 17518.8
27 Portland 0.042035 42870.82 8640.185
28 Providence 0.056324 18498.47 2737.019
29 Richmond 0.04495 24590.73 5294.051
30 St. Louis 0.023095 29147.49 9707.496
31 Tampa 0.055711 66049.88 11035.37
32 Tucson 0.047889 10922.03 2710.266
33 Washington DC 0.068125 39808.88 10710.28
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APPENDIX II
Let Ap T =[APir APm ] 'and Asr = [ASU ,...., ASNT ]\ where N is the number of
markets. Let WT = [e, Ap 7 _, , Asr _, , AX, T ] be the vector of right hand side variables,
where e is a vector of ones. Let VT =[s ]T ,...,sNT ] be the TV x 1 vector of transformed
disturbance terms. Let B = [a ,a
i
,a
2 ,/3i , S t ] ' be the vector of coefficients for the
equation.
Therefore,
ApT =WTB +VT (1)
Combining all the observations for each time period into a stack of equations, we have,
Ap = WB + V . (2)
The matrix of variables that qualify for instrumental variables in period T will be
ZT = [e, ApT_2 , As T_2 , AXIT ]
,
(3)
which changes with T.
To estimate B, we premultiply (2) by Z' to obtain
Z'Ap = Z'WB + Z'V
.
(4)
We then form a consistent instrumental variables estimator by applying GLS to equation
(4), where the covariance matrix Q = E{Z'WZ} . Q. is not known and has to be
estimated. We estimate (4) for each time period and form the vector of residuals for each
period and form a consistent estimator, Q , for Q . B , the GLS estimator of the
parameter vetor, is hence:
b =[w z(Q)" 1rwy^wz(ny } r Ap
.
(5)
The same procedure applies to the equation wherein Sales (S) are on the LHS.
y\
APPRENDIX III: Sales, Prices Statistics for long Panel
Market
Code
Market Average
GRRHPI
(%)
Average
GREMP
(%)
Average
SFSALES
RATE
Average
GRSALES
RATE (%)
1 Allentown* 2.03 1.10 4.55 4.25
2 Akron 1.41 1.28 4.79 4.96
3 Albuquerque 0.59 2.79 5.86 7.82
4 Atlanta 1.22 3.18 4.31 5.47
5 Austin 0.65 4.23 4.36 4.86
6 Bakersfield* 0.68 1.91 5.40 3.53
7 Baltimore* 2.54 1.38 3.55 4.27
8 Baton Rouge -0.73 1.77 3.73 5.26
9 Beaumont -1.03 0.20 2.75 4.76
10 Bellingham* 2.81 3.68 3.71 8.74
11 Birmingham 1.28 1.61 4.02 5.53
12 Boulder 2.43 2.54 5.23 3.45
13 Boise City 0.76 3.93 5.23 6.88
14 Boston MA* 5.02 0.95 2.68 4.12
15 Buffalo 1.18 0.71 3.79 2.71
16 Canton 1.02 0.79 4.20 4.07
17 Chicago IL 2.54 1.29 4.02 6.38
18 Charleston 1,22 2.74 3.34 6.89
19 Charlotte 1.10 3.02 3.68 5.56
20 Cincinnati 1.09 1.91 4.87 4.49
21 Cleveland 1.37 0.77 3.90 4.79
22 Columbus 1.19 2.15 5.66 4.61
23 Corpus Christi -1.15 0.71 3.42 3.88
24 Columbia 0.80 2.24 3.22 5.99
25 Colorado Springs 1.20 3.37 5.38 5.50
26
Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington -0.70 2.49 4.26 4.64
27 Dayton OH 1.18 0.99 4.21 4.40
28 Daytona Beach 1 86 306 4.77 5.59
29 Denver CO 1.61 1.96 4.07 5.81
30 Des Moines 1.18 2.23 6.11 5.64
31 Detroit Ml 2.45 ' 1.42 4.16 3.76
32 Flint 1.70 0.06 4.14 3.35
33 Fort Collins 2.32 3.63 5.82 6.72
34 Fresno CA* 1.35 2.04 4.69 6.08
35 Fort Wayne 0.06 1.76 4.16 7.73
36 Grand Rapids Ml 1 59 2.49 5.21 1.09
37 Greensboro NC 0.96 1.92 2.95 7.22
32
38 1 Harrisburg PA 0.56 1.69 4.24 3.45
39 Honolulu 3.05 1 28 2.99 12.66
40 Houston -1.27 1.38 3.95 4 53
41 Indianapolis IN 0.82 2.58 4.37 6.17
42 Jacksonville 1.42 2.96 4.60 7.23
43 Kansas City 0.70 1.66 5.35 5.17
44 Lansing 1.38 1.24 4.45 1.37
45 Lexington 0.67 2.43 6.23 3.25
46 Los Angeles CA* 3.51 0.99 2.26 5.40
47 Louisville 1.48 1.87 4.65 4.53
48 Little Rock 0.21 2.22 4.64 4.63
49 Las Vegas 1.07 6.11 5.11 8.14
50 Memphis 0.46 2.51 4.63 5.75
51 Miami FL 1.98 2.93 3.21 6.94
52 Milwaukee 1.90 1.24 2.42 5.16
53 Minneapolis 2.16 2.20 4.39 4.35
54 Modesto* 2.81 2.76 5.54 7.04
55 Napa* 4.63 3.27 4.35 5.32
56 Nashville 1.31 2.78 4.44 638
57 New York* 4.61 0.72 2.34 1.96
58 New Orleans 0.06 0.52 2.94 4.80
59 Ogden 0.67 3.25 4.22 6.08
60 Oklahoma City -1.21 0.95 5.17 3.66
61 Omaha 0.65 2.03 4.99 4.35
62 Orlando 0.88 5.21 5.30 6.33
63 Ventura* 3.95 2.61 4.19 5 83
64 Peoria 0.38 1.16 4.31 6.93
65 Philadelphia PA* 2.78 1.18 3.52 2.57
66 Phoenix 1.05 4.41 4.27 7.49
67 Pittsburgh 1.18 69 2.86 2.75
68 Portland* 2.52 2.61 4.17 7.05
69 Providence* 4.82 0.96 2.83 4 71
70 Port St. Lucie 1.63 3.59 5.60 7.18
71 Raleigh NC 1.15 3.91 4.06 5 42
72 Reno 1.55 2.94 3.94 8.60
73 Richmond 1.31 2.04 4.71 3.60
74 Riverside* 2.46 4.55 6.29 5 80
75 Rochester 0.61 0.80 5.16 1.01
76 Santa Rosa* 4.19 3 06 4 90 2.80
77 Sacramento* 3.02 3.32 5.51 4.94
33
78 San Francisco CA* 4.23 1.09 2.61 4.73
79 Salinas* 4.81 1.55 3.95 5.47
80 San Antonio -1.03 2.45 3.70 5.52
81 Sarasota 2.29 4.25 4.69 7.30
82 Santa Barbara* 4.29 1.42 3.16 4.27
83 Santa Cruz* 4.34 2.60 3.19 3.24
84 San Diego* 4.13 2.96 3.62 5.45
85 Seattle* 2.97 2.65 2.95 8.10
86 San Jose* 4.34 1.20 2.85 4.55
87 Salt Lake City 1.39 3.12 3.45 5.72
88 St. Louis 1.48 1.40 4.55 4.82
89 San Luis Obispo* 4.18 3.32 5.49 4.27
90 Spokane* 1.52 2.28 2.81 9.04
91 Stamford* 3.64 0.60 3.14 4.80
92 Stockton* 2.91 2.42 5.59 5.99
93 Tampa 1.45 3.48 3.64 5.61
94 Toledo 0.65 1.18 4.18 5.18
95 Tucson 1.50 2.96 3.32 8.03
96 Tulsa -0.96 1.00 4.66 4.33
97 Vallejo CA* 3.48 2.87 5.24 5.41
98 Washington DC* 3.01 2.54 4.47 3.26
99 Wichita -0.47 1.43 5.01 4.39
100 Winston 0.73 1.98 2.92 5.51
101 Worcester* 4.40 1.13 4.18 5.77
Notes: Table provides the average real price appreciation over the 25
average job growth rate, average sales rate, and growth in sales rate.
* Denotes "Costal city" in robustness tests.
years.
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